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to the main relief prayed for the complainant also asks for money
damages, a separate trial by jury is not within the realm of constitutional guaranty. One wonders whether this decision does not overrule Jackson v. Strong and The City of Syracuse v. Hogan, supra.
In conclusion we may say that while the overwhelming majority
of the earlier cases were favorable to the theory of one form of action,
the later cases tended towards the revival of the old forms of action.
Suits for equitable relief were dismissed, 49 even though the defendant
had appeared and interposed an answer, merely because the plaintiff
had failed to allege that he had no adequate remedy at law.50 Even
the traditional terminology of "actions at law" and "suits in equity"
is still retained, resulting sometimes in the dismissal of actions on
purely technical grounds. The question whether the New York judiciary will continue in its practice of bringing about a resurrection of
the old systems of law and equity, or will follow the lead of the
Ferguson, Lonsdale, and Jamaica Savings Bank cases, supra,51 is a
matter which belongs to the realm of pure speculation. Judging from
its previous vacillations it is unsafe to venture a prediction as to the
ultimate fate of the doctrine of the Merger of Law and Equity.
AARON FRIEDBERG.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MALPRACTICE

The limitational statutes have always provided a favorite battleground for legal gladiators. The arbitrary estoppel of one's right of
action has, to some, always seemed an unnecessary and harsh rule of
law; while others have vigorously, and in the main, correctly, maintained that the benefits of these statutes have far outweighed many
of their injustices. Like any other group of laws the statutes of limitation have proven to be defective in parts that could be quickly and
"Poth v. Washington Square M. E. Church of New York, 207 App. Div.
219, 201 N. Y. Supp. 776 (1st Dept. 1923); Chadbourne v. Mayers, 207 App.
Div. 754, 202 N. Y. Supp. 805 (1st Dept. 1924); Consolidated Rubber Tire
Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 135 App. Div. 805, 120 N. Y. Supp. 128
(2d Dept. 1909), aff'd, 199 N. Y. 536, 92 N. E. 1097 (1910) ; Black v. Vanderbilt, 70 App. Div. 16, 74 N. Y. Supp. 1095 (lst Dept. 1902); Spring v. Fidelity
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 183 App. Div. 134, 170 N. Y. Supp. 253 (3d Dept. 1918).
1 These cases hold that a complaint is subject to dismissal where equitable
relief is prayed for, but only a right to legal relief is stated. Of course this
rule is in direct conflict with Civil Practice Act § 111, which provides that the
complaint may be amended at any time during trial and may be "remitted to the
proper term or court to be disposed of, in order that the relief may be finally
granted which is appropriate to the facts, to the same extent as if the application
had been in the first instance for the relief granted."
"Another liberal decision was the recent case of Wainright & Page v.
Burr & McAuley, 272 N. Y. 130, 5 N. E. (2d) 64 (1937), wherein motion to
dismiss was denied although the action, cognizable in a court of equity, was
brought at law. All judges concurring.
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easily remedied, but for unknown or dubious reasons have been
allowed to remain unchanged. Probably one of the most flagrant
injustices of the statutes is to be found in the limitation on malpractice. 1
The Civil Practice Act of New York 2 states that "an action to
recover damages for * * * malpractice" must be commenced "within
two years after the cause of action has accrued." The cause of action
is deemed to have accrued at the time of the negligent injury,3 and it
is because of this fact that there is found so much opposition 4 to the
statute. Frequently, if not in the majority of cases, we find that a
plaintiff becomes aware of the injury to his person because of the
negligent conduct of the physician or surgeon only after the two-year
period of limitations has run. 5 A striking example of this is to be
found in the case of Conklin v. Draper,6 where the defendant surgeon
after operating upon plaintiff left the arterial forceps in her abdomen.
Plaintiff brought action four years after the operation but within two
years of discovery of the presence of the forceps. It was vigorously
contended that since defendant knew that he had left the forceps in
her abdomen and had failed to tell her about it, the act was one of
continuing malpractice against which the statute did not commence to
run until plaintiff learned of her condition. The court nevertheless
decided that the limitation period commenced to run from the date
that the injury was inflicted, regardless of whether or not defendant
knew of his act. The rule enunciated in Conklin v. Draperand cases
analogous to it, has been substantially adhered to, not only in New
York, but throughout the various states. 7
'N. Y. Crv. P Ac. AcT § 50.
2

Ibid.

' BURDIcK, LAW

OF TORTS (3d ed. 1913) § 373, p. 274, it is the general rule
that the statute of limitations, in malpractice action, runs from the time of the
breach of duty, and not from the time of the occurrence of the consequential

damages or of the discovery of the injury. Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578,
165 N. E. 653 (1929); see also cases digested in PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEW YORK PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1937) 32 to 51.
' BROTHERS, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
HEMER, MEDIcAL JURISPRUDENCE (1935)

(2d ed. 1925) 254, 255; OPPEN113, where the author says: "This

rule of Law (that the action accrues from the time of the doing of the injurious
act although plaintiff has no knowledge of that act) has, however, been the
subject of reported criticism. It is pointed out that promptness of action presupposes the knowledge of the existence of conditions which warrant such
action, and it is unreasonable to expect a person to bring suit for malpractice
until he has actual knowledge of facts which constitute the wrong."
'Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dept.
1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 620, 173 N. E. 892 (1930); Frankel v. Wolper, 181
App. Div. 485, 169 N. Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dept. 1918).
'229 App. Div. 227, 241 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dept. 1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y.
620, 173 N. E. 892 (1930).
'See cases cited note 5, supra; Wetzel v. Pius, 78 Cal. App. 104, 248 Pac.
288 (1926); Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N. W. 217 (1917); Bodne v.
Austin, 156 Tenn. 366, 2 S. W. (2d) 104 (1928); Cappuci v. Barone, 266
Mass. 578, 165 N. E. 653 (1929).
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Attempts to Avoid the Statute
1. Action Based on Contract
Since attorneys realized the hardship of this section of the Civil
Practice Act 8 and those statutes in other states similar to it, it is
naturally not surprising to discover the numerous attempts 9 made by
counsel for plaintiff to sidestep the statute in an effort to come within
some branch of the law other than malpractice. Early efforts to bring
the case within the field of contracts proved to be futile.' 0 The limitation period prescribed for actions against physicians, surgeons and
dentists for malpractice or negligence causing personal injuries was
applied to an action for any of such causes even though the complaint
therein was in form an action on contract." Notwithstanding the
fact that the petition stated a contractual relation between plaintiff and
defendant physician, if the gravamen of the complaint was found to be
the unskillful and negligent performance of defendant's medical services, it was held that the two-year limitation for malpractice was
applicable; 12 even though the complaint, after stating a contract between physician and patient for the performance of a surgical operaIt is interesting to note that, where the statutes of limitations has barred a
claim of malpractice during claimant's lifetime, the cause of action is not

revived in favor of his estate by his subsequent death from the original wrong.
The right of action created by Section 130 of the Decedent Estate Law does
not confer upon a decedent's estate the right to enforce an action which was
outlawed in his lifetime.
In Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., 270 N. Y. 287,
200 N. E. 824 (1936), the court held that a cause of action for breach of
statutory duty may be preserved to the decedent's estate if there was pending
undetermined at the time of his death a similar suit brought by him against
the defendant within six years of the alleged wrong, and in which a cause of
action is alleged of the same character namely breach of statutory duty.
However, in Johnson v. Stromberg-Carfson Telephone Mfg. Co., 250 App.
Div. 362, 294 N. Y. Supp. 793 (4th Dept. 1937), an action to recover damages
for death of plaintiff's intestate from silicosis, it was decided that the death
action was barred since the original action brought by the intestate had been
outlawed. The original complaint, though containing numerous allegations of
failure by defendant to provide safeguards required by the Labor Law to
promote ventilation of work rooms where the decedent was employed, was held
not to allege a cause of action for breach of statutory duty, but rather one for
negligence. The court expressly refused to follow the Schmidt case. That the
decision in the Johnson case is at least questionable cannot be controverted.
'N. Y. CIV. PRAC. Acr § 50.
'Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dept.
1926) ; Burrell v. Preston, 54 Hun 70, 7 N. Y. Supp. 177 (1889) ; Harding v.
Liberty Hospital, 177 Cal. 520, 171 Pac. 98 (1918).
o Hurlburt v. Gillett, 96 Misc. 585, 161 N. Y. Supp. 994, aff'd, 176 App.
Div. 893, 162 N. Y. Supp. 1124 (2d Dept. 1916); Horowitz v. Bogart, 218
App. Diy. 158, 217 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dept. 1926) ; Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34
W. Va. 252, 12 S. E. 519 (1917).
See note 10, supra.
a Hurlburt v. Gillett, 96 Misc. 585, 161 N. Y. Supp. 994, aff'd, 176 App.
Div. 893, 162 N. Y. Supp. 1124 (2d Dept. 1916).
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tion, made no reference to negligence on the part of the physician in
specific language, but charged "improper performance of the work to
the personal injury of the plaintiff."' 3 The court in Horowitz v.
Bogart 14 stated: "The nature of the charge of malpractice is not
changed by failing to sufficiently state it in necessary detail, or by
putting it in language suitable to the statement of a cause of action on
contract, omitting the usual allegations as to the absence of skill and
negligence."
The latest decision of the New York courts, however, indicates,
apparently, a definite change of policy. The Appellate Division of
the First Department in Keating v. Perkins 15 held that proof by the
plaintiff that part of one tooth, a gold inlay, remained within her body
with disastrous results required the conclusion that the defendant, a
surgeon dentist, failed to perform the special contract to extract four
teeth, including one tooth with a gold inlay, and each and every part
thereof from within the plaintiff's body, as alleged in the complaint
and admitted by defendant's answer; and this, notwithstanding the
degree of care exercised by defendant. The court, in this case, based
its decision on Conklin v. Draper,' where it was decided that the
second count, which contained nothing but strictly contractual allegations, without reference to pain and suffering, would be subject to the
statutory period prescribed for contract actions. It is to be noted,
however, that although the court does allow recovery on the theory
of contract in some instances, 17 the plaintiff can only secure partial
relief since the measure of damages is limited to the cost of original
operation, the second operation (to remedy the injury) and such other
additional medical expenses, as fees for nurses. He may not recover
for all the pain and suffering he has suffered as a result of the doctor's
negligence.
"Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 App. Div. 158, 217 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dept.

1926).
" See note 13, supra.
"250 App. Div. 9, 293 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dept. 1937).
229 App. Div. 227, 241 N. Y. 529 (1st Dept. 1930).
Some jurisdictions in malpractice cases give the patient a choice of
actions, tort or contract. Carpenter v. Walker, 170 Ala. 659, 54 So. 60 (1910) ;
Knowles v. Dark & Boswell, 211 Ala. 59, 99 So. 60 (1924) ; Staley v. Jameson,
46 Ind. 159 (1874) ; Burns, Ex'r v. Barenfield, 84 Ind. 43 (1882); Reinhardt
v. Frederick, 58 Ind. App: 421, 108 N. E.-2-58 (1915) ; Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34
W. Va. 252, 12 S. E. 519 (1890). The Indiana decisions are based entirely
upon the form of the complaint, the essential element being the promise on the
part of the physician and not the undertaking under the employment. Staley
v. Jameson, and Burns, Ex'r v. Barenfield are particularly interesting, as there
the contract action was upheld after the tort action was barred by the statute
of limitations.
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Actions Based on Fraud

Another favorite method of approach to avoid the ban of statutes
similar to Section 50,18 was to base the action on fraud. 19 But here;
too, we find the court was loath to entertain the suit where more than
two years had run from the date of the breach of duty. The failure
of the physician to speak and to disclose his negligent act was held
to be the breach of duty which constituted malpractice. 20 It has,
however, been decided in other jurisdictions that where the person
guilty of malpractice fraudulently conceals the fact so as to prevent
the injured from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute is tolled
until the cause of action is discovered or could have been discovered
21
through the exercise of diligence on the part of the injured party.
3.

The Treatment Theory

Many states, including New York, have adopted the rule that
22
the limitation period does not begin to run until the treatment ceases.
" N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 50.

10Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dept.
1926).
'In Tulloch v. Haselo, note 19, supra, plaintiff alleged that defendant, a
dentist, negligently permitted a tooth to go down her throat while plaintiff was
under ether and fraudulently concealed the fact from her, the tooth being
removed from her lung three years later. The court expressed a willingness
to infer from this allegation that defendant knew it had gone into her lung,
but said "it would be a dangerous precedent to establish to hold that equity
should interpose against the statute of limitations in a malpractice case, especially where no intentional injury is shown or to be inferred." The only apparent case applying the fraud exception to negligent injuries by a physician is
Bryson v. Aver, 32 Ga. App. 721, 124 S. E. 553 (1924), which describes the
relation of physician and patient as "confidential", so that a duty existed to
inform plaintiff of a pessary inserted during an operation and failure to disclose its presence was a "fraud" suspending the statute.
' Graendal v. Westrate, 171 Mich. 92, 137 N. W. 87 (1912); Burton v.
Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S. W. (2d) 503 (1934), where it was held that
defendant physician had a duty to exercise due care and, therefore, he cannot
be said as a matter of law not to have known of the negligent treatment; the
physician had a duty to disclose to the patient any injuries inflicted by his
carelessness, and failure to disclose was fraudulent concealment which would
toll the statute until the physician removed the foreign substance from the
patient's body, or, until the patient knew or should have learned of its presence.
But it was expressly held in Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P. (2d)
661 (1932), that negligence in breaking off a surgical needle and leaving a
piece in plaintiff's spine was not "fraud" for limitation purposes. See to the
same effect Peter v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535, 17 P. (2d) 244 (1932).
"Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N. Y. Supp. 608 (1923) ; Schmit
v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N. W. 622 (1931). In Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio
St. 106, 65 N. E. 865 (1902), the court, in holding that the period of limitation
for an action based upon defendant's leaving a sponge in an abdominal incision
would not commence with the date of the closing of the incision, made the
following statement: "The facts in the case at bar show a continuous obligation upon the plaintiff in error, so long as the relation or employment con-
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This is in effect an attempt by the court itself to avoid the injustice
of the two-year bar. The treatment and employment are considered
as a whole and thus if malpractice occurred therein the statute of limitations is held not to have started until the treatment was completed 3
Conclusion
A reading of the various cases on the particular subject will
convifice one that throughout most of them, especially those of recent
origin, there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the present
limitational period in malpractice actions. Nevertheless, because of
the wording of the statute, and the steadfastness with which the court
clings to the doctrine of stare decisis, little headway can be made to
remedy this problem. The patient relies almost wholly upon the
judgment of the surgeon, and under the usual circumstances of each
case is bound so to do; and if the injury is not reduced, and a normal
condition restored as fully or as speedily as expected, the patient is
still obliged to rely upon the professional skill, care and treatment of
the physician.2 4 How can the patient, with little or probably no
knowledge of medicine whatsoever, be held responsible for failing to
discover within the statutory time allotted, that a sponge or tubing,
for example, was left within his system, where at times, those versed
in medicine fail to do so? Malpractice is often unascertainable for
considerable periods, and attributed to various other causes, even
where due diligence has been used. Furthermore, while it may be
maintained that the cause of action has accrued either at the time the
treatment is terminated or at the time of the operation, it is difficult
to understand what benefit this is to a patient who until the discovery
of the hidden infecting element could not prove negligence. To
maintain the action on the theory of contract, on the other hand,
results in but partial relief, as has been previously pointed out.2 5 The
inevitable conclusion is that Section 50 of the New York Civil Practice Act and those statutes in other states which are analogous to it,
have proved to be unsound. Inasmuch as the courts have expressed
their unwillingness to circumvent the statute by judicial interpretation,
resort must be made to legislation.
It is submitted that perhaps the most logical remedy suggested
by the opponents of this present rule of law, is the proposal to base
tinued, and each day's failure to remove the sponge was a fresh breach of contract implied by law. The removal of the sponge was part of the operation, and
in this respect the surgeon left the operation incompleted."
H-uysman v. Kirsch, 91 Cal. Dec. 758, 57 P. (2d) 908 (1936) ; Bowers
v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361,124 N. E. 238 (1919) claimed that the doctrine
announced therein was conducive to that mutual confidence that is highly essential in the relation between surgeon and patient.
Bowers v. Santee, note 23, supra.
See subdivision entitled "Actions Based on Contract."
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the malpractice statute on the same ground as that of fraud. We find

that in actions based on fraud the statutory period is deemed to begin
to operate from the time that the fraud is discovered; for it is at that
moment that, by statute, the cause of action is said to accrue. 26 In
other words we might very well have the same two-year limitational
period for malpractice actions, but the statute should be tolled until
the discovery of the malpractice. Thus there would still be a limitation against the stale claims, the only difference being that the statutory period would commence at a somewhat later date. Undoubtedly
the physician, surgeon or dentist would not be as fully protected as
he is under the section as it stands today, but in the current trend of
opinion much of this protection is unwarranted and unjust.
To allow the statute 27 to remain as it presently stands, will only
result in a continuation of this needless muddle of affairs. Amendment of Section 50,28 as suggested above, would bring about a much
needed and desired reform.
ROBERT

I.

RUBACK.

N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 48. "An action to procure a judgment on the
ground of fraud. The cause of action in such a case is not deemed to have
accrued until the discovery by the plaintiff, or the person under whom he
claims, of the facts constituting the fraud."
N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 50.
2Ibid.

